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(Supp. III, 1956), the FCC ruling allowing the use of the Hush-A-Phone
and similar devices in interstate commerce is probably controlling on
intrastate communication as well. Since the same equipment is used
for both interstate and intrastate communication, the FCC ruling would
be rendered virtually ineffective if a state regulation to the contrary
were held valid. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 207 Ga. 675, 63

S.E.2d 878 (I95I).

BOOK REVIEWS
FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW. By Alpheus Thomas
Mason.' New York: The Viking Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 914. $8.75.
The function of an advocate is to marshal evidence in such a fashion
as to persuade his readers or audience that the person or cause represented by him is entitled to the judgment which he seeks. In carrying
out this task, he is expected to interpret the facts in the light most
favorable to his claim and to debase those data which he cannot turn
to his own service. The role of a scholar is different. His obligation is
to seek out all relevant information, to weigh impartially the information thus secured, and to render an unbiased judgment on it. Clearly, in
this biography of Harlan Fiske Stone, Professor Mason has chosen to
don the gown of the barrister rather than that of the student. It is not
an uncommon choice. An "authorized" or "official" biographer tends to
become an "admiring biographer." 2 Indeed, it is difficult to think of
judicial biography of the first rank which has not suffered this failing.
It is certainly true of Beveridge's classic on Marshall 3 and not much
less so of Merlo Pusey's Pulitzer Prize winning biography of Charles
Evans Hughes. 4 It is not meant as a condemnation of this volume,
therefore, to recognize it for what it is: a brief which may or may not
be sustained by the ultimate judgment of history. 5
In support of Professor Mason's cause, we have it on the highest
authority that Stone was "a good man" and "a mighty sound and
liberal-minded thinker." 6 But not even Mr. justice Holmes' judgments
are to be accepted uncritically. The issue remains whether Stone is
worthy of the recognition which so surely belongs to others with whom
he served on the Court: Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, and Cardozo. This
volume confirms the view that Stone's claim on history must rest solely
on his judicial career. For, unlike Holmes', his pre-judicial writing
HARLAN

' McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
Woodrow Wilson, The Times (London), Dec. 28, 1956, p. 7,
cols.2 6-7.
2 Frankfurter,

MARSHALL (i916).
(I951).
5 See FRANKFURTER, Chief Justice Stone, in OF LAw AND ME 157 (1956).
6e Hou~rzs-LAsxi LETTRES 737, 8o0 (Howe ed. 1953); 2 id. at 824; see
Dunham, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in MR. JTSTICE 47 (Dunham & Kurland eds.
1956); FRANKxuRTER, Chief Justice Stone, in OF LAW AND MzN is (1956); L.
HAND, Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, in THE SPirr or
LIBERTY 201-8 (2d ed. i953); Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 CoLumn.
L. Rsv. 764 (1946).
BEvEWRmGE, THE LIFE or Jox-

I PSEy, CHARLES EVANs HuGHEs
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offers little of enduring value - indeed some of it would best be
forgotten; 7 unlike Cardozo's, his extrajudicial writings contain no
masterpiece; unlike Brandeis', his career at the bar is devoid of
participation in cases or causes of public importance; and unlike
Hughes', his service in public office, except as a member of the Court,
was of short duration and almost no importance. 8 And much as one
would like to applaud his service as dean of the Columbia Law School
in doing battle with that ogre, Nicholas Murray Butler, on issues of
legal education and law-school personnel, it is not quite certain that
this was not one of the few times when Butler was on the side of the
angels.9
Mason's primary techniques for persuading his readers of Stone's
great qualities as a jurist are two in number. The first is the denigration of all others who might have a claim to honor as jurists, presumably on the theory that a giant will look still larger among pygmies.
Not even Holmes and Brandeis are exempt from this treatment. Thus:
"Judiciousness is not the word that clings to the lips of Brandeis's
warmest admirers. For those who regard the epitome of the judge's
function as majestic indifference, Brandeis lacked 'judicial temperament.'" (p. 775) His opinions "carried vehement assurance, rivaling
'the pronouncement of a believer in the Ptolemaic astronomy that the
new Copernican world will not do.' Even Brandeis's warmest friends
saw him as a proud, imperious man." (p. 349) Brandeis' opinions, in
Stone's view, presumably endorsed by Mason, were "pretentious and
made him suspicious. 'I have read every one of these cases,' he [Stone]
once commented in reference to one of Brandeis's long footnotes, 'andnot one of them supports his proposition.'" (p. 349) The opinions of
Brandeis were also labelled by Stone as "unduly ostentatious." (p.
219) Moreover, Brandeis resorted to "trickery" in a case in which
Stone had written for the majority, by relying in a separate opinion on
a jurisdictional question which had not been raised at conference. (p.
21g) And if Brandeis was overconcerned with details, Holmes was too
little concerned with them. Only Stone arrived at the golden mean.
Holmes tended to dash off his opinions in a "cavalier" (p. 333) fashion
ignoring "'all the tough points'" (p. 327). Even so, Holmes' opinions
were "so cryptic-as to leave his position unclear." (p. 351) Despite these
7 Even Mason is apologetic, see pp. x15, 125, 434, about the Hewitt lectures,
printed in STONE, LAW AND ITs ADUNSTRATION (2d ed. 1924). A discussion of
Stone's legal but nonjudicial writings is to be found on pages 888-91.
8 Stone served, during the first world war, on a board of inquiry charged with
determining the propriety of the denial of relief from service to some who claimed
to be conscientious objectors. For about a year prior to his appointment to the
Court, Stone served as Attorney General in President Coolidge's cabinet, to which
post he was called to lend an aura of respectability to a Department of Justice
theretofore headed by the infamous Harry M. Dougherty. In this post his most
noteworthy actions were the appointment of J. Edgar Hoover to head the FBI
and the recommendation of the promotion of Judge Learned Hand from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
9 For an uninformative account of this contest, see A HisTORY OF THE SCHOOL
OF LAW, COLUimBA UN=vEsrrY cc. IX-XI (Goebel ed. 9g55).
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faults, much of Stone's reputation is rested by Mason on his alignment
with Holmes and Brandeis.' 0 "Among the great figures in American
constitutional law, only Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone clearly emerge
as a team and as a trio of equals." (p. 774) Among these equals,
however, Stone is pre-eminent. "Above all, Stone was a judge." (p.
776) Mason's final judgment is an adoption of an expression by A. A.
Berle, Jr., whose wisdom is, of course, beyond question: Brandeis was
a "social architect," Holmes, an "essayist," but Stone was a "judge."
(P. 776)
If Holmes and Brandeis suffer from belittlement by sniping, it is
Charles Evans Hughes, the bate noir of this volume, who is bombarded.
Starting with the preface, where there is a somewhat less than subtle
pinprick," Mason carries on a vehement campaign of destruction against
Stone's predecessor as Chief Justice. One example is the contrast between the series of motives attributed to Hughes for assigning himself
important cases and those motives which Mason says led Stone as Chief
Justice to undertake to write for the Court. This reaction is, perhaps,
not an unnatural one, so frequently have less biased commentators compared Stone unfavorably with Hughes in the conduct of the highest
judicial office in the land. 12 The result is that though the book is
replete with reference to Hughes, as it could not fail to be, the reader
will be hard put to find remarks which could be construed as complimentary. Indeed, the vendetta is carried so far as to include Hughes'
biographer, Merlo J. Pusey, as a target.' 3 It would be equally unfortunate if Mr. Justice Roberts' place in history were to depend on
the picture painted by Professor Mason.' 4
The second peculiar method of proof is the copious quotation of
approving comments about what Stone has written. It may well be
'0 See especially pp. 251-62, 774-77.
" Mason notes that Stone "had no chance, even if there had been inclination,
to sort them [his papers] out, make selections, impose restrictions, much less
prepare notes for the guidance of his biographer." (p. xiii) All these things
Hughes had and exercised the opportunity to do. See i PusEY, CHARMs EvANs
HUGHES at vii (i95i).

What Mason does not recognize is the fact that Stone, always with an eye on
history, exercised every opportunity for the preparation of self-serving memoranda.
Indeed, as one of his law clerks has observed, the weekly letters to his sons were
written in anticipation of their use by his biographer.
" Perhaps it has been put most kindly in i FREuND, SUTRLsAN, HowE, &
BROWN, CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS ON CONsTiTUTiONAL LAW at xlvi (1954):

"Though Stone knew the satisfaction of becoming Chief Justice, one suspects that
his name will be remembered more for his role as Associate Justice than for his
achievements as Chief." More direct and invidious comparisons with Hughes may
be found in PRicHn-, Civir LiBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 1 (1954) ; Schlesinger, The Supreme Court, x947, Fortune, Jan. 1947, P. 211.

It is perhaps pertinent at this point to quote from Judge Learned Hand's
remarks about Hughes: "You might differ with him as radically as you chose;
you might believe that he had gone clean astray; but to question the sincerity
and purity of his motives betrayed either that you had not understood what he
was after, or that your own standards needed scrutiny." HAND, Charles Evans
Hughes, in THE Spmnrr o LIBERTY 222 (2d ed. 1953).
13 See pp. 282, 415 n.*, 451.
'4 Compare pp. 455-64 with FRANMQITmTR, Mr. Justice Roberts, in OF LAW
AND MENT 204 (1956).
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that Stone's personality was sufficiently well known to his correspondents that they wrote nothing but praise. There were surely some,
like Sterling Carr, too blinded by adoration to be critical. But it is
extremely hard to believe that such critics as Professors Thomas Reed
Powell and Felix Frankfurter were so all-approving as the quotations
from their letters reveal. And it is highly unlikely that all newspaper
comment was as completely favorable as the quotations chosen for
inclusion would suggest.
Lest the foregoing mislead, it should be stated that the various
approaches adopted by Mason are to be applauded rather than condemned, if properly understood. For Mason deals with these matters
as Stone himself would have done. The result is that the reader gets
a somewhat idealized picture of the Justice: not an objective portrait,
but rather the man as he saw himself. Indeed, probably few biographers
have so completely and successfully identified themselves with their
subjects as Mason has with Stone. This is carried to the point that
Mason's views change from chapter to chapter as Stone's did from year
to year. Thus, Hoover's stature seems to rise and fall in accordance
with his consultation of Stone; Hoover is in disfavor for his failure to
appoint Stone to the Chief Justiceship and returns to grace when
Roosevelt fails to call on Stone for guidance. Professor Frankfurter's
capabilities as a student of the Court (perhaps, in Mason's eyes, best
revealed in his complimentary letters to Stone), which qualify him as
the most worthy successor to Mr. Justice Cardozo, seem to disappear
when Mr. Justice Frankfurter fails to follow where Stone would lead.
To repeat, this is obviously not an objective history of the Court and
its personnel, but clearly a history as Stone would have written it, with
himself cast in the role of Moses. Accordingly, we should not ask
whether Hughes was what Mason says he was. (We have ample evidence
that the picture of Hughes is not a fair one.) But we should realize
that this was Hughes as Stone saw him. For example, if we cannot
accept the suggestion that it was hesitancy concerning the decision
which caused Hughes to assign United States v. Darby 15 to Stone,
we can be sure that this was Stone's understanding as to why he
received the assignment, though Mason never comes out and ascribes
such thoughts to Stone.16 And if we know that Hughes, Frankfurter,
and Jackson were responsible in large measure for persuading President Roosevelt to make Stone Chief Justice (pp. 566-68), 17 we also
know that this must have invoked little feeling of gratitude or indebtedness on Stone's part, for Roosevelt, Hughes, Frankfurter, and Jackson
continue to be assigned the roles of "bad guys" even after the Stone
promotion.
Of the personal qualities of Stone as thus revealed by his alter ego,
perhaps the most striking is his vanity. A former colleague of his on
the Columbia faculty, to whom Mason turns time and again as an
15 312 U.S. Ioo (1941).
16 See p. 5i.
17 See also 2 PUSEY, CHALS EvAs HUGHES 587-88 (1951).
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authority on Stone's behavior, has described Stone as one of the three
vainest men to sit on the bench since the turn of the century. Two
of the many incidents recounted by Mason provide some proof for
this evaluation. The first is as revealing of the author as it is of his
subject. Harold Laski had written to Stone reporting that he had
received from Holmes letters 18 which contained great praise of Stone's
capacities. On receipt of this information, Stone bombarded Laski
with requests for copies of such letters and even went to the extent of
asking Professor Frankfurter to help secure them. Laski, in typical
fashion, found it easier to recreate such letters than to search his files for
them, and he sent Stone these creations as the work of Mr. Justice
Holmes. Stone exulted in them. Professor Mark Howe's evaluation
is quoted in part: "'It seems to me quite clear that Laski sat down and
manufactured for Stone's satisfaction the string of compliments . .

..

(PP. 334-35 n.*) Mason's somewhat snobbish comment concerns itself
not with Stone's vanity in soliciting these letters, but rather with
Laski's forgeries, or, more charitably, with what Mr. Justice Frankfurter has termed Laski's tendency to "reinforce

. .

. history by

fancy." 9 "The Laski thus self-revealed," writes Mason, "was the
man who for nearly two decades continued a warm and intimate
correspondence with Justice Holmes." (pp. 334-35 n.*) This knowledge
of Laski's imaginative capacities, however, does not deter Mason from
relying on Laski as an authority when the views Laski expressed are
in accord with what Mason would like to think to be the truth, at least
for the purposes of this volume. 20
The second revealing episode concerns Stone's failure to write a
separate opinion in the Minnesota-mortgage-moratorium case. 2 1 According to Mason, all the good ideas contained in Hughes' opinion
for the Court in that case are attributable to Stone. Nevertheless
"Stone himself may have regretted his hesitancy to speak out. 'The
opinion [Hughes'] was given such widespread publicity, and C.E.H.
praised so highly, one article likening him to Marshall,' Miss Jenkins
recorded, 'that I think H.F.S. was cured and will write his dissents and
concurrences in the future for all his hesitation to do so.'" (p. 365)
That Stone cherished the praise of newspapers is recorded in his own
words as well. In a letter to his sons, after the gold-clause cases,2 2 hewrote: "'My opinion has been a good deal commented upon in the papers
in this part of the country. The Washington Post ran a long editorial on
it, and several of the New York papers have mentioned it. .

.

. So I feel

well satisfied with my somewhat anomalous position in agreeing with the
result in the Government Bond case, but not with the reasoning of my
brethren.'" (p. 39i)
18 See

i HoLMEs-LAsKcI LETTERS 737, 8oo (Howe
191 id. at xv (foreword by justice Frankfurter).
20 See, e.g., the quotation from Laski on Brandeis

ed.

'953)

; 2 id. at 824.

at 349 n.*, and at 532 on the
flag-salute case, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 6oi (1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
21 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 29o U.S. 398 (1934).
2

Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (x935); Perry v. United

States, 294 U.S. 330 (i935).
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This love of praise, when combined with another of Stone's facets,
his capacity to talk too much and to the wrong people, often put him
in hot water. His "confidential" remarks were constantly reported in
the Washington press. In a town in which the newspapers live in
large part on intentional "leaks" and cocktail-party gossip, Stone did
much to keep happy the reporters who felt their power to make or
break a government official's reputation.2 3 Presumably, he did this
knowingly. "In utilizing their columns as purveyors of his ideas, he
cherished the illusion that 'if you treat them all right they'll give you
a break.'" (p. 7OO) Thus, when Mr. Justice Black joined the Court
and soon ,demonstrated that he was fully capable of performing his
task without the necessity of guidance from Stone, Stone spent his
morning walks to Court in the company of Marquis Childs, talking
to him of Black's deficiencies as a jurist. Of course these views, with
little camouflage of source, soon showed up in the columns of the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, for which Childs then worked. Stone thought:
"'Fine, just what is needed to educate the public.'" (pp. 472-73) At
Stone's suggestion, Childs elaborated the story in an article in
Harper's. Stone denied responsibility for the resulting explosion. (p.
474) But then, courage was not Stone's strong point, as is revealed
by the partially told story of the Roberts retirement letter, even in the
version recounted by Mason. (pp. 765-69) As Mr. Justice Jackson
politely put it in his statement to Mason about this incident: "'Stone
dreaded conflict, and his dread was so strong that it seemed to me that
he feared action which would bring it about.'" (p. 769)
If vanity, garrulity, and weakness were Stone's personal deficiencies
as a judge, they were more than compensated for by other great judicial
capacities. As Professor Thomas Reed Powell has said: "There was
never any question as to the strength of his brain. . . He always had
a capacity for growth." 24 To quote equally impressive authority:
"Throughout his judicial career he endeavored to look beyond those
formulas which offered the indecisive comforts of familiarity to considerations of a more conclusive sort . .
,, 25 This, however, is not
the place for a detailed evaluation of Stone's opinions and positions.
Mason quotes extensively in this very lengthy book from the opinions,
and he makes full use of the Justice's files, which include both his
self-serving annotations and the detailed memoranda exchanged with
other members of the Court, memoranda on which future historians
of the Court will have to place great reliance and in which current
23 Thus, "Stone's gesture reached the press with dramatic effect . . . ." (P. 336)
The gesture was Stone's offer to President Hoover to resign to make a place
for Cardozo.
"This biting indiscretion, picked up and reported in a Washington gossip
book, was not calculated to foster wholehearted co-operation." (P. 339) The
"indiscretion" was a "sarcastic" comment on a Hughes opinion: "'Whenever I
read one of his opinions I feel as if I'd been through a cyclone with everything
but the kitchen stove flying in my face.'" (p. 339)
24 POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES UT ColNSTUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 46
(1956).
25 x Fzu-ND, SuTrnERi.D, HOWE, & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 12, at xlvi.
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readers will have much interest. The current controversy over Stone's
place in history, however, does not depend on a detailed examination
of all his judicial writings, for everyone seems agreed that Stone was
one of the more important jurists of his day. The question which is
mooted is the ground on which his fame must rest. His supporters are
divided into two camps. One of the groups, which includes Professor
Thomas Reed Powell and Judge Learned Hand, applauds him for his
exercise of "a sincere respect for the legislative judgment. Such a respect
as a judge became characteristic of him, whatever he may have thought
as a private person. Stone once told me that Mr. Justice Holmes had
impressed upon him that it was not his function to try to play God. 26
These acclaimers of Stone's greatness assert that his views of judicial
restraint were applied alike to cases involving "property interests" and
"personal rights." Thus, Judge Learned Hand has written:
It needed little acquaintance with the robust and loyal character of the
Chief Justice to foretell that he would not be content with what to him
was an opportunistic reversion at the expense of his conviction as to the
powers of a court. He could not understand how the principle, which he
had all along supported, could mean that, when concerned with interests
other than property, the courts should have a wider latitude for enforcing
their own predilections than when they were concerned with property
itself. There might be logical defects in his canon, but it deserved a
consistent application or it deserved none at all; at any rate it was not
to be made into an excuse for having one's way in any given case. Most
of all was its even-handed application important to the judges themselves, since only by not intervening could they hope to preserve that
independence which was the condition of any successful discharge of
their duties.
It was because he was throughout true to this view that, it seems to
me, we should
especially remember him with gratitude, and honor him
27
as a judge.
Not so, says the other school of Stone admirers, represented by
Mason and Professor Allison Dunham, a former law clerk of Stone's.
Judge Hand's applause resulted from "imputing his own ideas to
Stone." (p. 512) The fact of the matter, they say, is that, "at the very
moment the Justices [Stone and his colleagues] abandoned guardianship of economic interests, they seemed ready to shoulder a special
responsibility for speech, thought, and religion." (p. 512) This group
of Stone admirers finds that, beginning with "the most famous footnote
in constitutional history, footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938),"
26 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 24, at 47.

28

Stone enunciated and

L. HAND, Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, in THE
SpIR OF LIBERTY 206-07 (2d ed. 1953).
281 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE, & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 12, at xlvi.
The footnote as quoted by Mason reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
27
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applied a principle calling for a different role for the Court in "civil
liberties cases" from the rule of self-abnegation in "property cases."
Mason contends that "it is difficult to square Judge Hand's interpretation with Stone's record .

. ."

(p.

512)

Professor Dunham is more

cautious: "The idea of a difference between civil liberties cases and
other Due Process cases attracted some supporters from other members
of the Court, but the untimely death of Stone before full development
of the theory has put the testing and refining of the political restraint
idea in the hands of others." 29 Followers of "box-score jurisprudence"
indicate that the record supports Judge Hand rather than Mason. 0
It might be suggested, however, that the answer to this question, and
to many others, may be found in Stone's records, which would reveal
Stone's voting in cases in which certiorari was denied and appeals either
affirmed or dismissed per curiam. For here would be ample evidence
of whether Stone, or other members of the Court, really applied to
"civil liberties cases" a standard which rejected "the presumption of
constitutionality" which Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, among others,
struggled so valiantly to achieve as the standard of the Court, at
least with regard to cases which involved "only property rights."
In conclusion, it should be said that this "authorized biography" has
fulfilled the function of presenting us with a most adequate picture of
the man who was Mr. Justice Stone. It is a work which all students
of the Court should feel compelled to examine, for it contains much
information about Stone and the Court which has never before been
published. Of course, it must be read with an appreciation of the
author's strong bias on behalf of his subject. An authoritative biography
is still to come. But it probably should not be attempted until the
papers of other Justices who served with Stone are also accessible.
And then it should be written, if possible, by one who has the capacity
for a "deep understanding of the judicial process, delicate analysis of
character, and the creative humility of the artist." 31
PHurn B. KURLAND *
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes, which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the 'ourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial
minorities . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
(P. 513) Mason records that the second and third paragraphs were written by Stone's
law clerk, Louis Lusky, and adds: "It was not unusual for Stone to allow his
law2 clerks to use footnotes as trial balloons for meritorious ideas." (p. 513 n.*)
0 Dunham, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in MR. JusTicE 62 (Dunham & Kurland
eds.2 x956).
OSee, e.g., Pnrrcnx"n, TnE RoosEVELT COURT 130-31, 261 (1948); cf. Pair.cHETT, CnVm LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 33-35, 243-44 (1954).
a FRAwKTUmTER, A Note on Judicial Biography, in Op LAW AND ME 1o9-1o
(1956).
* Professor of Law, The Law School, University of Chicago.

